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Abstract
Protocol narrations are a widely-used informal means to describe, in an idealistic manner, the functioning of cryptographic
protocols as a single intended sequence of cryptographic message exchanges among the protocol’s participants. Protocol narrations
have also been informally “turned into” a number of formal protocol descriptions, e.g., using the spi-calculus. In this paper, we
propose a direct formal operational semantics for protocol narrations that fixes a particular and, as we argue, well-motivated
interpretation on how the involved protocol participants are supposed to execute. Based on this semantics, we explain and formally
justify a natural and precise translation of narrations into spi-calculus. An optimised translation has been implemented in OCaml,
and we report on case studies that we have carried out using the tool.
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0. Introduction
The setting. In the cryptographic protocol literature, protocols are usually expressed as narrations (see for example
[14,25]). A protocol narration is a simple sequence of message exchanges between the different participating principals
and can be interpreted as the intended trace of the ideal execution of the protocol. The protocol in Table 1 is a typical
example of this style. Two principals A and B are both connected to the server S with whom they share the secret
keys kAS and kBS , respectively. The protocol tells the story where A wants to establish a secret connection (a shared
key kAB) with B via the common server S: first, A should contact S, then S forwards the key kAB to B. Finally, A
uses this key to exchange secret data with B.
While much of the literature is concerned with stating and proving a security property of protocols like this one,
we are more interested in the bare operational content of the description technique of narrations.
Our own motivation for the interest in a formal semantics for narrations is that we had implemented a
“straightforward” translator [19] from protocol narrations into the spi-calculus, itself a pi-calculus extended with
encryption primitives [3]. We then wanted to formally prove our translator correct but faced the problem that there
was no formal intended semantics to compare to. This lacking semantics is what we provide within this paper. Indeed,
I A short version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of Trustworthy Global Computing 2005, LNCS 3705, pages 163–181.
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Table 1
Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol
A; S : (A . {(B . kAB )}kAS )
S ; B : {(A . (B . kAB ))}kBS
A; B : {m}kAB
it turns out that the attempt to properly formalise narrations brings one already much closer to spi-like executable
descriptions, but there are a number of insightful observations along the way, on which we report here as well.
The challenge. Despite being rather intuitive, the description technique of protocol narrations contains lots of implicit
concepts. Looking for a formal semantics, these need to be rendered explicit. For example, Abadi [1] pointed out that
“informal protocol narrations” need to be complemented with explanations of some either implicitly assumed facts or
additional information to remove ambiguities. He raised four tasks that need to be pursued:
(1) One should make explicit what is known (public, private) before a protocol run, and what is to be generated freshly
during a protocol run.
(2) One should make explicit which checks the individual principals are expected to carry out on the reception of
messages.
(3) Principals act concurrently, in contrast to the apparently sequential idealised execution of a run according to a
narration.
(4) Concurrency occurs also at the level of different protocol sessions, which may happen to be executed
simultaneously while sharing the principals across.
(Interestingly, Abadi used these requirements to motivate the use of the spi-calculus as a description technique for
“formal protocol narrations”.)
The first item above should be clear: data is missing otherwise. To this aim, narrations usually come with a bit
of explanation in natural language on the spirit of the protocol and on the assumptions made. Essentially, these
assumptions consist of expliciting the pieces of data known in advance by the agents1 and those that are to be freshly
generated during the course of a protocol run.
The second item above results from the too high level of abstraction of message exchanges, noted as A;B : M .
There are a number of problems connected to the fact that message M is usually transmitted from A to B by passing
through an asynchronous insecure network where a potential intruder can interfere [18]. Thus, once B receives a
message, it may be just the expected one according to the protocol, but it may also be an intended message received
at the wrong moment and, worse, it may be an unintended message forged by some malicious attacker. So, B needs
to perform some informative checks. But precisely which ones? For example, when B receives M it must first check
in how far, at this very moment, it “understands” M (with respect to possible encryptions). Then, if B acquires
new knowledge by this analysis, it must ensure that this new knowledge is consistent with its previously acquired
knowledge. Some careful analysis is due, requiring a suitable representation of knowledge.
The third item above looks innocent at first, but once the non-atomic passage of messages through the network is
properly taken into account, some surprising effects arise due to parts of later message exchanges (referring to the or-
der of exchanges in a narration) possibly occurring before earlier message exchanges have completed or even started.
The fourth item above is again intuitively straightforward, but the description technique of narrations completely
ignores the problem.
Our approach. In this paper, we present solutions to the first three items, leaving the fourth for future work (see
Section 8). Concerning the first item, we simply add a declaration part to narrations (Section 1). Here, we are no
different from competing approaches (see the paragraph on related work). On item two, we propose (in Section 2) to
compile exchanges of the form A;B : M into three separate syntactic parts, corresponding to:
(i) A asynchronously sends M towards B,
(ii) B receives some message (intended to be M), and
(iii) finally B checks that the message it just received indeed has the expected properties (associated with M , from
the point of view of B).
1 We use the terms principal and agent interchangeably.
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Table 2
Protocol narrations
M, N ::= a A {M}N (M . N ) pub(M) priv(M) H(M) (messagesM)
T ::= A;B : M (exchanges)
L ::=  T ; L (narrations)
D ::= A knows M A generates n private k (declarations)
P ::= D ; P L (protocol
narrations D)
With respect to the required checks, our approach is to automatically generate the maximum of checks derivable from
the static information of protocol narrations. We call the resulting refined notion of narrations executable, because
it will allow us to formalise an operational semantics of narrations, which would not be possible with an atomic, or
synchronous, interpretation of message exchanges.
Concerning the third item, we profit from the above decomposition of message transmission and introduce a natural
structural equivalence relation on executable narrations that may bring any of the (con)currently enabled actions to
top level. On this basis, we provide a labelled transition semantics (Section 4).
Finally, we rewrite the executable narrations within the spi-calculus, which is then only a minor, albeit insightful,
remaining step (Section 5). We then establish a straightforward formal operational correspondence between the two
semantics.
Tool support. We have implemented the previous developments in OCaml (see Section 6). Due to the overly big size
of the generated formulae, we studied possible simplification strategies. To this end, we have implemented naı¨ve ideas
such as removing duplicated atoms, or removing atoms like [E :M ] when E is a message or when it appears as a
subexpression of the remaining formula. We also perform some rewriting inside formulae, which according to our
experience gives good results in practise.
Impact. Our paper targets at two different audiences.
To the cryptographic protocol audience, we offer a high-level bridge to the low-level (process calculus motivated)
semantics of protocol narrations. However, it is our primary intention to accomplish this undertaking such that a reader
does not need to be proficient in spi-calculus or its relatives. Thus, we propose – for an only slightly refined narration
syntax – a formal semantics in which we cast in high-level narration terms the behaviour of a corresponding low-level
spi-calculus semantics. Analysis techniques can now be built on top of this direct semantics.
To the process calculus audience, mainly as a by-product, we offer a gentle systematic way to comprehend and
formally justify spi-calculus representations corresponding to protocol narrations. In particular, the uniform generation
of “checks-on-reception” was lacking in earlier translations.
Related work and future work are deferred to the concluding section (Section 8).
1. Extending protocol narrations
Like in the competing approaches on the representation of protocol narrations, we extend the narrations with a
header that declares the initial knowledge of each agent, the names generated by them and also the names that are
assumed to be initially only known by the system (this last point permits to simulate a first pass where shared keys are
securely distributed among some agents).
Hence, an extended protocol narration is composed of two parts: a sequence of declarations followed by
the narration itself. The agents are picked among a countably infinite set A of agent names ranged over
by A, B,C, . . . , S, . . . and the messages are built upon a countably infinite set N of names ranged over by
a, b, c, . . . , k, l,m, n, . . .. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that A ∩ N = ∅.
We implicitly assume that all the agents involved in the protocol know each other; this can be generalised by
explicit declarations. The syntax of messages and protocol narrations is given in Table 2.
Among the messages, any name a, agent name A, encryption {M}N (using N as encryption key) or pair (M . N )
can itself be used as a shared key. In contrast, a message of the form pub(M) or priv(M) can only be used as an
asymmetric key. The inverse key M−1 of a message M is defined as below:
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Table 3
Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol, with formal
declarations
private kAS ; A knows kAS ; S knows kAS ;
private kBS ; B knows kBS ; S knows kBS ;
A generates kAB ; A knows m
A;S : (A . {(B . kAB )}kAS ) ;
S;B : {(A . (B . kAB ))}kBS
A;B : {m}kAB ; 
M−1 def=

pub(M ′) if M = priv(M ′)
priv(M ′) if M = pub(M ′)
M otherwise.
Here, we adopt the point of view that – under the assumption that some participant already “knows” two messages M ′
and M – this participant has the power to “verify” whether M ′ is in fact (equal to) the inverse M−1 of M . Evidently,
participants are not capable to “compute” the private key (pub(M))−1.
The meaning of private k is that k is a name which is initially only available for the agents involved in the protocol.
Typically, it is useful to simulate that an agent A and a server S initially share a secret key kAS . The meaning of
A knows M is simply that, initially, agent A knows the message M . Finally the meaning of A generates n is that
A will generate a fresh name n (typically a nonce). For the sake of clarity, we enforce fresh generated names to be
declared explicitly. Table 3 shows the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol using our framework.
It often happens in cryptographic protocols that a secret is shared by several participants. For this reason, we
propose to introduce as a macro the construct
A1, . . . , An share k
which is intended to mean that the agents A1, . . . , An share the secret name k. This macro is simply expanded into:
private k ; A1 knows k ; . . . ; An knows k.
To ease the writing of formal declarations, one can also imagine to introduce the shortcut A1, . . . , An knows M to
mean A1 knows M ; . . . ; An knows M .
2. Compiling protocol narrations
Target syntax. As motivated in the introduction, executable narrations (set X, as defined in Table 4) are to be more
explicit about the behaviour of individual agents. Instead of atomic exchanges of the form A;B : M as used in the
standard narrations of Table 2, we observe four more fine-grained basic actions (nonterminal I in Table 4): emission
A:B!E of a message expression E (evaluating to M , see below), reception B:?x of a message and binding it to a
variable x (see below), check B:φ for the validity of formula φ from the point of view of principal B, and scoping νk,
which is reminiscent of the spi-calculus and represents the creation and scope of private names. Scoping is decoupled
from principals, allowing us to use a single construct for names that are private and generated according to the
declarations of Section 1.
In interacting systems, when an agent receives a message, it binds it to a fresh variable for reference in subsequent
processing. For this purpose, we introduce a well-founded totally ordered countably infinite set x, y, z, . . . of
variables V that we assume to be disjoint from A ∪ N. An agent can operate in different ways on a message: (1) as
with the previous standard narrations, it can concatenate two messages, encrypt one message with another (the key),
compute the hash code of a message or take the public/private part of a message; (2) it can project a message onto
its parts using pi1(E) or pi2(E) (if E “represents” a pair of two messages) or decrypt it using DF (E) (if it knows the
inverse key “represented by” F that was used to encrypt the message “represented by” E). Since an agent does not
only handle messages but also variables, we introduce the notion of message expressions (E), including the above
further operations. The process of finding out whether some expression indeed “represents” some particular message,
is formalised using the evaluation function in Table 5. The definitions are straightforward and offer no surprises.
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Table 4
Syntax of executable narrations
E, F ::= a A {E}F (E . F) pub(E) priv(E) H(E) (expressions E)
x DF (E) pi1(E) pi2(E)
φ, ψ ::= tt [E=F ] [E :M ] inv(E, F) φ ∧φ (formulae F)
I ::= νk A:B!E A:?x A:φ (simple action)
X ::=  I ; X (executable narrations X)
Table 5
Evaluation of expressions (can fail, in particular if v(E) 6= ∅) and formulae
Definition of J·K : E→ {⊥} ∪M
JEK def= E if E ∈ N ∪ AJ(E . F)K def= (M . N ) if JEK = M ∈ M and JFK = N ∈ MJpi1(E)K def= M if JEK = (M . N ) ∈ MJpi2(E)K def= N if JEK = (M . N ) ∈ MJ{E}F K def= {M}N if JEK = M ∈ M and JFK = N ∈ MJDF (E)K def= M if JEK = {M}N ∈ M and JFK = N−1 ∈ MJH(E)K def= H(M) if JEK = M ∈ MJpub(E)K def= pub(M) if JEK = M ∈ MJpriv(E)K def= priv(M) if JEK = M ∈ MJEK def= ⊥ in all other cases
Definition of J·K : F→ {true, false}
JttK def= trueJφ ∧ψK def= JφK and JψKJ[E=F ]K def= true if JEK = JFK = M ∈ MJ[E :M ]K def= true if JEK = M ∈ MJinv(E, F)K def= true if JEK = JFK−1 = M ∈ MJφK def= false in all other cases
Formulae φ on received messages are described by (conjunctions of) three kinds of checks: equality tests
[E=F ] on expressions denote the comparison of two bit-streams of E and F ; well-formedness tests [E :M ] denote
the verification of whether the projections and decryptions contained in E are likely to succeed; inversion tests
inv(E, F) denote the verification that E and F evaluate to inverse messages. The evaluation function of Table 5
is straightforwardly extended to formulae; note that, according to it, [E :M ] is just a macro for [E=E ]. Similarly,
inv(E, F) can be encoded (for example) as [DF ({(E . F)}E ) :M ] (see also Section 6).
Table 4 lists the syntax of expressions, formulae and executable narrations. In the following, we will omit the
trailing;  of a non-empty executable narration. Moreover, we overload the operator; to also concatenate narrations.
Definition 1. Let M ∈ M, E ∈ E, φ ∈ F, x ∈ V. We let n(M), n(E), and n(φ) denote the set of names occurring
in M , E , and φ, respectively. Similarly, we let v(E) and v(φ) denote the set of variables occurring in E and φ. E{M/x }
and φ{M/x } denote the substitution of M for x in E and φ, respectively.
Knowledge representation. As motivated in the introduction, the central point of the actual behaviour of protocols
is to find out which checks are to be performed. We further motivated that such checks need to be based on (1) the
narration code, which statically spells out the intended message to be received, and (2) the current knowledge at the
moment of reception, which imposes constraints on how much the recipient can dynamically learn from the received
message and on what other information the newly acquired knowledge must be consistent with.
S. Briais, U. Nestmann / Theoretical Computer Science 389 (2007) 484–511 489
Table 6
Synthesis
SYN-PAIR
(M, E) ∈ S(K ) (N , F) ∈ S(K )
((M . N ), (E . F)) ∈ S(K )
SYN-ENC
(M, E) ∈ S(K ) (N , F) ∈ S(K )
({M}N , {E}F ) ∈ S(K )
SYN-HASH
(M, E) ∈ S(K )
(H(M),H(E)) ∈ S(K )
SYN-PRIV
(M, E) ∈ S(K )
(priv(M),priv(E)) ∈ S(K ) SYN-PUB
(M, E) ∈ S(K )
(pub(M),pub(E)) ∈ S(K )
Table 7
Analysis
ANA-INI
(M, E) ∈ K
(M, E) ∈ A0(K )
ANA-FST
((M . N ), E) ∈ An(K )
(M, pi1(E)) ∈ An+1(K )
ANA-SND
((M . N ), E) ∈ An(K )
(N , pi2(E)) ∈ An+1(K )
ANA-DEC
({M}N , E) ∈ An(K ) (N−1, F) ∈ S(An(K ))
(M,DF (E)) ∈ An+1(K )
ANA-DEC-REC
({M}N , E) ∈ An(K ) (N−1, F) 6∈ S(An(K ))
({M}N , E) ∈ An+1(K )
ANA-NAM-REC
(M, E) ∈ An(K ) M ∈ N ∪ A
(M, E) ∈ An+1(K )
ANA-PUB
(pub(M), E) ∈ An(K )
(pub(M), E) ∈ An+1(K )
ANA-PRIV
(priv(M), E) ∈ An(K )
(priv(M), E) ∈ An+1(K )
ANA-HASH
(H(M), E) ∈ An(K )
(H(M), E) ∈ An+1(K )
Instead of accumulating only the dynamically acquired messages (stored in variables x) we propose to tightly
connect the (according to the narration) statically intended messages M with the dynamically received actual
messages x . For this, we simply use pairs (M, x). Since consistency checks will then (have to) operate on such
pairs, we need to generalise this representation of principal knowledge to finite subsets ofM×E. The underlying idea
is that a pair (M, E) means that the expression E is supposed to be equal (or: has to evaluate) to M .
The following definition introduces knowledge sets, and also some traditionally employed operations on them:
synthesis reflects the closure of knowledge sets using message constructors; analysis reflects the exhaustive recursive
decomposition of knowledge pairs as enabled by the currently available knowledge.
Definition 2 (Knowledge). Knowledge sets K ∈ K are finite subsets ofM × E.
The set of names occurring in K is denoted by n(K ).
The synthesis S(K ) of K is the smallest subset ofM × E containing K and satisfying the SYN-rules in Table 6.
The analysis A(K ) of K is ⋃n∈NAn(K ) where the sets Ai (K ) are the smallest sets satisfying the ANA-rules in
Table 7.
Our definition of analysis refines the usual approach reminiscent of Paulson [27]. Instead of directly defining
a “flat” analysis set, we had to define a finitely stratified hierarchy (An(K ))n∈N. (See Appendix A for a detailed
comparison of the two approaches.) Essentially, the index n of an analysis set An(K ) approximates the number of
proper deconstruction steps that were needed in order to derive its knowledge items (see the rules ANA-INI, ANA-FST,
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ANA-SND, and ANA-DEC). In contrast to the standard approach, corresponding to An(K ) ⊆ An+1(K ), here only
certain items – not all of them – may be propagated from analysis level n to n+1 without proper deconstruction step.
As the following example shows, with the notion of knowledge of this paper the simple rule An(K ) ⊆ An+1(K )
would allow us to possibly analyse the same message several times, in different ways, which would indeed be harmful.
Assume that we remove the rules ANA-DEC-REC and ANA-NAM-REC as well as the indices of analysis sets in Table 7
(which amounts to admitting An(K ) ⊆ An+1(K )). If we now analyse the knowledge set K = {(k, k), ({k}k, x)}
according to this “standard” approach then we would first get the pair (k,Dk(x)), then the pair (k,DDk (x)(x)), then
(k,DDDk (x)(x)(x)), etc. The resulting analysis set A(K ) would be of infinite size, and thus not even be a knowledge
set2, thus prohibiting a finite representation of the knowledge of participants.
Instead, we control the propagation from analysis level n to n+1 by the rules ANA-NAM-REC and ANA-DEC-
REC. Knowledge items (M, E) can only be propagated to the next level of the analysis if M is not analysable (i.e.,
deconstructable) with the knowledge of the same level: either M is a pure name (possibly an agent name) or M can
not be decrypted with knowledge from the same analysis level. Note that when computing the sequence (An(K ))n∈N,
the rules ANA-FST, ANA-SND and ANA-DEC strictly decrease the size of the messages, so they can only be applied a
finite number of times. Thus, it is obvious that the sequence (An(K ))n∈N converges and thus A(K ) is finite.
Example 3. Consider K0 = {(A, A), (B, B), (S, S), (kAS, kAS), (kBS, kBS)}.
Let K = K0 ∪
{
((A . {(B . kAB)}kAS ), x0)
}
.
We have A(K ) = K ∪

( A , pi1(x0) )
( {(B . kAB)}kAS , pi2(x0) )
( (B . kAB) , DkAS (pi2(x0)) )
( B , pi1(DkAS (pi2(x0))) )
( kAB , pi2(DkAS (pi2(x0))) )
 .
Generating checks. The above knowledge representation allows us to generate the checks required on message
reception in a justified manner. Recall that these checks must verify (1) in how far the expectations of the recipient
on the received message (as expressed statically in the narration) are matched according to the recipient’s current
knowledge, and (2) in how far the gained knowledge is consistent with its previously acquired knowledge.
Thus, obviously necessary checks are due to the type of messages: if an expression shall correspond to a pair then
it better allows for projections; if an expression shall correspond to an encrypted message, then it better allows for
decryption with the appropriate key – but only if it is known by the receiver.
Less obviously required checks result from the following observation: a message (identifier) M may occur more
than once in a protocol narration. Thus, it may happen that, in some knowledge set, M is related to two different
expressions E1 and E2, via (M, E1) and (M, E2). As M was precisely used in protocol narrations to indicate the
very same message, such a knowledge set can only be considered consistent if E1 and E2 indeed evaluate to the same
message. In the context of asymmetric keys, it can also happen that, in some knowledge set, we find a combination of
(M1, E1) and (M2, E2) where M1 = M2−1. In this case, also the corresponding E1 = E2−1 should be satisfied.
Let us assume, as it is customary, that agents dispose of some meaningful initial knowledge (usually of the form
(M,M) with M representing some initially known key or participant name). Then, the consistency check for repeated
occurrences of data implicitly may take care of testing, e.g., whether some received datum was sent by the expected
agent.
To formalise these requirements, we generate consistency formulae.
Definition 4 (Consistency Formula). Let K be a knowledge set. Its consistency formula Φ(K ) is defined as follows:
Φ(K ) def= ∧(M,E)∈K [E :M ]
∧ ∧(M,Ei )∈K ∧ (M,E j )∈S(K )∧ Ei 6=E j [Ei =E j ]
∧ ∧(M,Ei )∈K ∧ (M−1,E j )∈S(K ) inv(Ei , E j ).
2 In contrast, the “standard” analysis of the corresponding (i.e., projected onto the static component) knowledge set K1 = {k, {k}k } yields
A(K1) = {k, {k}k }.
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The first conjunction clause checks that all the expressions can be evaluated. The second conjunction clause checks
that if there are several ways to build a particular message M , then all the corresponding expressions evaluate to
the same entity. (Note that the omission of the subclause Ei 6= E j would make the first clause redundant; we just
kept it for clarity of the respective concepts.) The third conjunction clause checks that if it was possible to generate
a message M and its inverse M−1, then the corresponding expressions must also be mutually inverse. Note that this
clause represents the principle of a rather paranoid lack of confidence by a protocol principal in its peers in that it
includes all imaginable malicious situations. On the downside, it may sometimes create lots of tests that may not be
informative or intuitive in all contexts (see Example 5). More refined, and less paranoid, principles to generate tests
are of course possible and can be considered as variations of the above third clause.
When generating the above consistency formula, we compare pairs taken from K with pairs taken from S(K ). The
following example shows why it does not suffice to compare just the pairs in K . On the other hand, we should not
compare any possible combination of pairs taken from S(K ), because this would yield an infinite formula.
Example 5. If K = {(m, x), (H(m), y)}, we have that
Φ(K ) = [ x :M ] ∧ [ y :M ] ∧ [H(x)= y ] ∧ inv(x, x)∧ inv(y, y)∧ inv(H(x), y).
Observe that, if the consistency formula did not consider the pairs taken from S(K ), then the test [H(x)= y ] would
not be present.
Reducing knowledge sets. Knowledge sets can often be simplified without loss of information by reducing complex
elements to their parts. In our case, we can further simplify due to the occurrence of duplicated elements; there is no
loss of information once the consistency formula of Definition 4 remembers the duplication.
Definition 6 (Irreducibles). Let K be a knowledge set.
The set of irreducibles I(K ) is defined by
I(K ) def= irr(A(K )),
where
irr(K ) = {(M, E) ∈ K | M ∈ N ∪ A}
∪ {({M}N , E) ∈ K | ¬(∃F1, F2 : (M, F1) ∈ S(K )∧ (N , F2) ∈ S(K ))}
∪ {((M . N ), E) ∈ K | ¬(∃F1, F2 : (M, F1) ∈ S(K )∧ (N , F2) ∈ S(K ))}
∪ {(H(M), E) ∈ K | ¬(∃F : (M, F) ∈ S(K ))}
∪ {(priv(M), E) ∈ K | ¬(∃F : (M, F) ∈ S(K ))}
∪ {(pub(M), E) ∈ K | ¬(∃F : (M, F) ∈ S(K ))} .
Let ∼ denote the equivalence relation onM × E induced by
(M, E) ∼ (N , F) ⇐⇒ M = N .
We let rep(K ) denote the result of deterministically selecting3 one representative element for each equivalence class
induced by ∼ on K .
Example 7. We continue Example 3. We have:
I(K ) = K0 ∪
{
(A, pi1(x0)), (B, pi1(DkAS (pi2(x0)))), (kAB, pi2(DkAS (pi2(x0))))
}
rep(I(K )) = K0 ∪
{
(kAB, pi2(DkAS (pi2(x0))))
}
.
Here, we assume that the function rep(·) selected (A, A) instead of (A, pi1(x0)), and (B, B) instead of
(B, pi1(DkAS (pi2(x0)))). Moreover, we have that
({(A . (B . kAB))}kBS , {(A . (B . pi2(DkAS (pi2(x0)))))}kBS ) ∈ S(rep(I(K ))).
3 Choose an arbitrary well-founded total order on expressions and select the smallest expression according to this order.
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The following lemma states a number of simple sanity properties.
Lemma 8. Let K be a knowledge set. We have:
(1) S(irr(K )) ⊆ S(K )
(2) S(rep(K )) ⊆ S(K )
(3) ∀(M, E) ∈ S(K ) : ∃F : (M, F) ∈ S(irr(K ))
(4) ∀(M, E) ∈ S(K ) : ∃F : (M, F) ∈ S(rep(K ))
(5) ∀(M, E), (N , F) ∈ S(rep(irr(K ))) : M = N ⇒ E = F.
Proof. (1) Because irr(K ) ⊆ K and S(·) is monotonic.
(2) Because rep(K ) ⊆ K and S(·) is monotonic.
(3) By induction on the structure of M .
(4) By induction on the derivation of (M, E) ∈ S(K ).
(5) By induction on the structure of M . 
The following proposition studies the relation between evaluation consistency formulae of a knowledge set K and
some operations on the latter.
Proposition 9. Let K be a closed knowledge set (where no variables appear) and φ = Φ(K ). If JφK = true then
(1) ∀(M, E) ∈ S(K ) : ∀(M, F) ∈ S(irr(K )) : J[E=F ]K = true
(2) ∀(M, E) ∈ S(K ) : ∀(M, F) ∈ S(rep(K )) : J[E=F ]K = true
(3) JΦ(irr(K ))K = true
(4) JΦ(rep(K ))K = true.
Proof. (1) By induction on the structure of M .
(2) By induction on the derivations (M, E) ∈ S(K ) and (M, F) ∈ S(K ).
(3) Obvious, because irr(K ) ⊆ K .
(4) Obvious, because rep(K ) ⊆ K . 
The compilation. We now have set up all the required ingredients to compile an extended protocol narration into an
executable protocol narration. Technically, while traversing the syntax of a given narration, the translation function
keeps a record of global information on the used variables and hidden names, as well as local (i.e., participant-
dependent) information on their knowledge on generated names.
Definition 10 (Compilation). The translation X J·K(υ,$,κ,ν) : D→ X is defined inductively in Table 8, where υ ⊂ V
(current set of used variables), $ ⊂ N (current set of private names), κ : A → K (partial mapping from agents to
their current knowledge), and ν : A→ N (partial mapping from agents to their current set of generated names).
Let P ∈ D be a protocol narration. Let AP denote the set of agent names appearing in P . Then, X JPK(∅,∅,κP ,∅)
denotes the compilation of P , where the initial knowledge κP is defined by κP (A) := {(B, B) | B ∈ AP } for all
A ∈ AP .
P is called well-formed iff its compilation is defined.
For simplicity, the compilation assumes that all agents initially know each other, as expressed in the initial
knowledge set κP . Checks-on-reception are deduced from the individual knowledge set of a receiver. To avoid to
perform the same checks again and again, the compilation keeps the knowledge sets of κ in reduced form, i.e.,
κ(A) = rep(I(κ(A))). To update f∈ {κ, υ}, we note f [x←y] with f [x←y] (x) = y and f [x←y] (z) = f(z) for
z 6= x .
The compilation of private k and A generates n checks in both cases that the local (or generated) name is fresh,
but differs with respect to the addition of the fresh name to the knowledge sets of agents: whereas A generates n
increases the knowledge of A, the name k of private k is not added to any knowledge; this task is deferred to explicit
A knows k clauses for the intended A.
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Table 8
Definition of X J·K·
X JK(υ,$,κ,ν) def= 
X JA knows M ; PK(υ,$,κ,ν) def= X JPK(υ,$,κ ′,ν) if n(M) ∩ ⋃
A∈A
ν(A) = ∅
where K ′A
def= κ(A) ∪ {(M,M)}
and κ ′ def= κ [A← rep(I(K ′A))]
X Jprivate k ; PK(υ,$,κ,ν) def= νk ; X JPK(υ,$∪{k},κ,ν)
if k 6∈ $ ∪ ⋃
A∈A
(n(κ(A)) ∪ ν(A))
X JA generates n ; PK(υ,$,κ,ν) def= νn ; X JPK(υ,$,κ ′,ν′)
if n 6∈ $ ∪ ⋃
A∈A
(n(κ(A)) ∪ ν(A))
where K ′A
def= κ(A) ∪ {(n, n)}
and κ ′ def= κ [A← rep(I(K ′A))]
and ν′ def= ν [A← ν(A) ∪ {n}]
X JA;B : M ; PK(υ,$,κ,ν) def= A:B!E ; B:?x ; B:φ ; X JPK(υ∪{x},$,κ ′,ν)
if A 6= B and (M, E) ∈ S(κ(A))
where x
def= min(V \ υ)
and K ′B
def= κ(B) ∪ {(M, x)}
and κ ′ def= κ [B ← rep(I(K ′B ))]
and φ
def= Φ(A(K ′B ))
The compilation of A;B : M checks that M can be synthesized by A, picks a new variable x and adds the pair
(M, x) to the knowledge of B.4 The consistency formula Φ(A(K ′B)) of the analysis of this updated knowledge K ′B
defines the checks φ to be performed by B at runtime. Note that this must be done on the non-reduced version. In fact,
it is precisely the consistency check that allows us then to continue with the knowledge in reduced form.
Finally, note that our concept of well-formedness of a protocol narration corresponds to the notions of executability
in [12]).
Example 11. LetWMF be the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol presented Table 3.
We have κWMF : A → K
A 7→ {(A, A), (B, B), (S, S)}
B 7→ {(A, A), (B, B), (S, S)}
S 7→ {(A, A), (B, B), (S, S)}
WMF is well-formed and its compilation is
X JWMFK(∅,∅,κWMF,∅) =
νkAS ; νkBS ; νkAB ;
A:S!(A . {(B . kAB)}kAS ) ; S:?x0 ; S:φ0 ;
S:B!{(A . (B . pi2(DkAS (pi2(x0)))))}kBS ; B:?x1 ; B:φ1 ;
A:B!{m}kAB ; B:?x2 ; B:φ2
where φ0, φ1 and φ2 are given below.
4 Usually, narrations are defined such that the sender A is supposed to statically know the precise name B of the intended receiver. In a dynamic
scenario, the compilation would need to check that B is synthesizable by A.
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A knows m ; A knows kA ; A knows pub(kB)
B knows m ; B knows kB ; B knows pub(kA) ;
A generates n1 ;
B generates n2 ;
A;B : {((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1)))}priv(kA)
B;A : {({((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1)))}priv(kA) .H(n2))}priv(kB )
A;B : n1
B;A : n2
Fig. 1. The Exchange Subprotocol of the ASW protocol (simplified).
{((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1)))}priv(kA)
{({((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1)))}priv(kA) .H(n2))}priv(kB )
n1
n2
Fig. 2. Contract form at the end of the exchange.
φ0 ≈ [ A=pi1(x0) ] ∧ [ B=pi1(DkAS (pi2(x0))) ]
∧ inv(pi2(DkAS (pi2(x0))), pi2(DkAS (pi2(x0))))
φ1 ≈ [ A=pi1(DkBS (x1)) ] ∧ [ B=pi1(pi2(DkBS (x1))) ]
∧ inv(pi2(pi2(DkBS (x1))), pi2(pi2(DkBS (x1))))
φ2 ≈ inv(Dpi2(pi2(DkBS (x1)))(x2),Dpi2(pi2(DkBS (x1)))(x2)).
We refer the reader to Section 6.2 where this protocol is studied with our tool.
3. A detailed example: The ASW protocol
3.1. The protocol
The ASW protocol is an optimistic fair-exchange protocol for contract signing, proposed by Asokan, Shoup and
Waidner in [4]. Fig. 1 shows the slightly simplified version of the Exchange Subprotocol of ASW (that we will
simply refer afterwards as the ASW protocol) that Caleiro, Vigano` and Basin have used in [13] to illustrate that a
direct interpretation of protocol narrations would be too na}¨ive. A direct interpretation simply lists all the external
actions each participant should commit, but does not explicit the internal checks and does not verify that these external
actions are actually feasible. This protocol also shows that it is not sufficient to check received messages just once,
immediately after their reception, because the receiving participant might only later on gain further knowledge that
would enable it to analyse the structure of the just-received message more deeply.
The goal of the ASW protocol is to establish a valid contract between the two participants A and B. The protocol
proceeds in two rounds.
First, the two participants send their respective so-called public commitments H(n1) or H(n2) with the contract text
m they have agreed upon; n1 and n2 being nonces generated by the two participants and called their respective secret
commitments to the contract. For this first round, the respective messages are digitally signed with the participants’
private keys. As usual, the signature can be verified by using the corresponding public key.
Then, in the second round, the participants exchange their respective secret commitments so that they can check
the public commitment they have received in round one by hashing this value.
At the end of this exchange, both participants have a valid contract of the form indicated in Fig. 2.
In this protocol, the participants should in some sense backtrack their analysis once they have received the message
of the second round. Indeed, when B first receives H(n1), it cannot check that this corresponds to the hashing of the
nonce n1 since n1 is not yet part of B’s knowledge. However, once B receives n1 in the second round, it is able to
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νn1 ; νn2 ; (1)
A:B!E1 ; B:?x1 ; B:φ1 ; (2)
B:A!E2 ; A:?x2 ; A:φ2 ; (3)
A:B!E3 ; B:?x3 ; B:φ3 ; (4)
B:A!E4 ; A:?x4 ; A:φ4 (5)
Fig. 3. Executable narration compiled from ASW protocol.
check that the hashing of n1 is effectively equal to the message that it has supposed to be H(n1) in the first round; this
check should occur before B sends its own public commitment to A.
3.2. Compilation of the ASW protocol
We now study this protocol in our setting. We first define some shortcuts:
M1
def= {((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1)))}priv(kA)
M2
def= {({((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1)))}priv(kA) .H(n2))}priv(kB ).
Computing the initial knowledge. The initial knowledge set of participants A and B is, by definition,
κ A0
def= {(A, A), (B, B)}
κB0
def= {(A, A), (B, B)} .
Compilation of the declarations. When compiling the declarations, the compilation process checks that n1 and n2 are
distinct names not used in the other pieces of information declared to be known at the beginning of the protocol. After
computation, we obtain the following knowledge sets
kA1
def= {(A, A), (B, B), (m,m), (n1, n1), (kA, kA), (pub(kB),pub(kB))}
kB1
def= {(A, A), (B, B), (m,m), (n2, n2), (kB, kB), (pub(kA),pub(kA))} .
The line 1 of Fig. 3 corresponds to the compilation of the declarations.
First message. When compiling the first message exchange, the compilation process
(1) checks that A can synthesize message M1 by looking for an expression E1 such that (M1, E1) ∈ S(kA1 ). Here, the
unique candidate is expression E1
def= {((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1)))}priv(kA).
(2) takes a new variable x1 to be bound to the message that participant B will receive; according to the statically
defined information contained in the narration, this message is expected to be M1.
(3) computes the consistency formula φ1 of the analysis of the knowledge set resulting from the addition of (M1, x1)
to kB1 , and computes a reduced form of k
B
1 ∪ {(M1, x1)}.
Here we have
A(kB1 ∪ {(M1, x1)})
= kB1
∪ {(M1, x1)}
∪ {(((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1))),Dpub(kA)(x1))}
∪ {((pub(kA) .pub(kB)), pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1)))}
∪ {((m .H(n1)), pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1)))}
∪ {(pub(kA), pi1(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))))}
∪ {(pub(kB), pi2(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))))}
∪ {(m, pi1(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))))}
∪ {(H(n1), pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))))} .
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After some simplifications (see 6.1), the consistency formula appears to be equivalent to
φ1
def= inv(x1, x1)
∧ inv(pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))), pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))))
∧ [pub(kB)=pi2(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
∧ [pub(kA)=pi1(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
∧ [m=pi1(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ].
And a possible candidate for rep(I(kB1 ∪ (M1, x1))) is
kB2
def= kB1
∪ {(M1, x1)}
∪ {(H(n1), pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))))} .
Note that (M1, x1) is not removed because B has no way to digitally sign a message with the private key of A.
(4) generates line 2 of Fig. 3.
Second message. The compilation of the second message exchange is similar to the first message but with role of A
and B swapped. So the compilation process
(1) checks that B can synthesize the message M2 by looking for an expression E2 such that (M2, E2) ∈ S(kB2 ).
The candidate is expression E2
def= {(x1 .H(n2))}priv(kB ).
(2) takes a new variable x2 to be bound to the message that participant A will receive; according to the statically
defined information contained in the narration, this message is expected to be M2.
(3) computes the consistency formula φ2 of the analysis of the knowledge set resulting of the addition of (M2, x2) to
kA1 and computes a reduced form of k
A
1 ∪ {(M2, x2)}.
Here we have
A(kA1 ∪ {(M2, x2)})
= kA1
∪ {(M2, x2)}
∪ {((M1 .H(n2)),Dpub(kB )(x2))}
∪ {(M1, pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2)))}
∪ {(H(n2), pi2(Dpub(kB )(x2)))}
∪ {(((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(n1))),Dpub(kA)(pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2))))}
∪ {((pub(kA) .pub(kB)), pi1(Dpub(kA)(pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2)))))}
∪ {((m .H(n1)), pi2(Dpub(kA)(pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2)))))}
∪ {(pub(kA), pi1(pi1(Dpub(kA)(pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2))))))}
∪ {(pub(kB), pi2(pi1(Dpub(kA)(pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2))))))}
∪ {(m, pi1(pi2(Dpub(kA)(pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2))))))}
∪ {(H(n1), pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2))))))} .
After some simplifications, the consistency formula appears to be equivalent to
φ2
def= inv(x2, x2)
∧ inv(pi2(Dpub(kB )(x2)), pi2(Dpub(kB )(x2)))
∧ [pi1(Dpub(kB )(x2))=M1 ].
And a possible candidate for rep(I(kA1 ∪ (M2, x2))) is
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kA2
def= kA1
∪ {(M2, x2)}
∪ {(H(n2), pi2(Dpub(kB )(x2)))} .
(4) generates line 3 of Fig. 3.
Third message. For the third message, the compilation process
(1) checks that n1 is synthesizable by A. The expression n1 is a candidate to build the message n1 (the pair (n1, n1)
has been added to the knowledge set of A during the compilation of the declarations).
(2) takes a new variable x3 to be bound to the message that participant B will receive; according to the statically
defined information contained in the narration, this message is expected to be n1.
(3) computes the consistency formula φ3 of the analysis of the knowledge set resulting of the addition of (n1, x3) to
kB2 and computes a reduced form of k
B
2 ∪ {(n1, x3)}
Here we have
A(kB2 ∪ {(n1, x3)}) = kB2
∪ {(n1, x3)} .
After some simplifications (taking into account that at this point of the executable narration, the formula φ1
should have been satisfied), the consistency formula appears to be equivalent to
φ3
def= inv(x3, x3)
∧ [H(x3)=pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ].
And a possible candidate for rep(I(kB2 ∪ (n1, x3))) is
kB3
def=
(
kB2 \
{
(H(n1), pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))))
})
∪ {(n1, x3)} .
Note that the pair (H(n1), pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1)))) has been removed from the knowledge set of B because now
B knows n1 and thus can synthesize himself H(n1).
(4) generates line 4 of Fig. 3.
Fourth message. Finally, for the fourth message, the compilation process
(1) checks that n2 is synthesizable by B. The expression n2 is a candidate to build the message n2.
(2) takes a new variable x4 to be bound to the message that participant a will receive; according to the statically
defined information contained in the narration, this message is expected to be n2.
(3) computes the consistency formula φ4 of the analysis of the knowledge set resulting of the addition of (n2, x4) to
kA2 and computes a reduced form of k
A
2 ∪ {(n2, x4)}.
Here we have
A(kA2 ∪ {(n2, x4)}) = kA2
∪ {(n2, x4)} .
After some simplifications (taking into account that at this point of the executable narration, the formula φ2
should have been satisfied), the consistency formula appears to be equivalent to
φ4
def= inv(x4, x4)
∧ [H(x4)=pi2(Dpub(kB )(x2)) ].
And a possible candidate for rep(I(kA2 ∪ (n2, x4))) is
kA3
def= (kA2 \
{
(H(n2), pi2(Dpub(kB )(x2)))
}
∪ {(n2, x4)} .
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Note that the pair (H(n2), pi2(Dpub(kB )(x2))) has been removed from the knowledge set of A because now A
knows n2 and thus is able to synthesize himself H(n2).
(4) generates line 5 of Fig. 3.
3.3. The ASW protocol and the pattern-matching spi-calculus
If we just look at participant B, the spi-calculus term we can derive from the executable narration of Fig. 3 is (see
also Section 5)
(νn2) B(x1).
inv(x1, x1)∧ inv(pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))), pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))))
∧ [pub(kA)=pi1(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
∧ [pub(kB)=pi2(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
∧ [m=pi1(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
A〈{(x1 .H(n2))}priv(kB )〉.
B(x3).
inv(x3, x3)
∧ [H(x3)=pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
A〈n2〉. 0 .
But it is not clear to us how such a process can be expressed in the pattern-matching spi-calculus in the spirit of
what is defined in [22], even if we ignore the third clause of the consistency formula (Definition 4) and thus adopt a
less paranoid approach.
Indeed, in this case, the spi-calculus process would be
(νn2) B(x1).
[pub(kA)=pi1(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
∧ [pub(kB)=pi2(pi1(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
∧ [m=pi1(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
A〈{(x1 .H(n2))}priv(kB )〉.
B(x3).
[H(x3)=pi2(pi2(Dpub(kA)(x1))) ]
A〈n2〉. 0 .
A possible term in the pattern-matching spi-calculus would be
new n2; inp B
{
x • {((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(x)))}priv(kA)
};
out A {({((pub(kA) .pub(kB)) . (m .H(x1)))}priv(kA) .H(n2))}priv(kB );
inp B {•x};
out A n2; 0 .
But unfortunately, the first pattern is not implementable in the sense of [22]. Indeed, being able to write
{x • · · ·H(x) · · ·} in a pattern position would intuitively mean that it is possible to inverse the supposed one-way
function H(·) : M→ M and thus get a value x from its hashing H(x).
4. Executing protocol narrations
In this section, we propose an operational semantics for narrations. It proceeds in a traditional syntax-directed
manner by analysing the current top-level construct in order to see what to execute next. Since narrations contain
some implicit concurrency among principals, we introduce a structural reordering relation to shuffle concurrently
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Table 9
Substitution
{M/x }@A def= 
(A′:B!E ; X){M/x }@A def=
{
A′:B!E ; X{M/x }@A if A′ 6= A
A:B!E{M/x } ; X{M/x }@A otherwise
(A′:?y ; X){M/x }@A def=

A′:?y ; X{M/x }@A if A′ 6= A
A:?y ; X{M/x }@A if A = A′ and y 6= x
A:?x ; X otherwise
(A′:φ ; X){M/x }@A def=
{
A′:φ ; X{M/x }@A if A′ 6= A
A:φ{M/x } ; X{M/x }@A otherwise
(νn ; X){M/x }@A def= νn ; X{M/x }@A
enabled actions to the top level. The actual execution of steps further needs to take care of the evaluation of messages
to be sent, and also to prevent from name clashes that are possible due to the presence of binders.
Binders and α-conversion. Our language of executable narrations contains two sorts of binders: one for names and
one for variables.
The first binder is introduced by the construction νn. If X = νn ; X ′, then n is bound in X (i.e. the free occurrences
of n in X ′ refers to this binder). As the identity of n is not important, we identify X with νn′ ; X ′{n′/n} where n′ is
a name that is not free in X and X ′{n′/n} is X ′ where all the free occurrences of n has been replaced with n′. X
and νn′ ; X ′{n′/n} are called α-equivalent. In the following, we identify α-equivalent executable narrations. Now, for
an executable narration X , we can define the usual bound names bn(X), free names fn(X) of X and, moreover, if
n, n′ ∈ N, X{n′/n}, the substitution of n′ for n in X .
The second binder is the one introduced by the construction A:?x . If X = A:?x ; X ′, then x is bound in the
actions of X ′ concerning A: indeed, if further in the executable narration, B refers to x , the x is not the same as
the one used by A. Since variables will typically be substituted with messages, we do not need α-conversion on
variables but we need to define a new kind of local substitution: if X is an executable narration, x ∈ V, M ∈ M with
n(M)∩ bn(X) = ∅ (which can be assured by choosing a suitable α-equivalent version of X ), and A ∈ A, we define in
Table 9 the substitution X{M/x }@A of M for x in X on A.
Reordering. Protocol narrations are sequences of actions. However, the sequential character is not always causally
motivated. Instead, the order of two consecutive actions carried out by different principals can always be swapped,
because – after our split of message exchanges in the compilation process of Section 2 – they are independent. The
same holds for the consecutive occurrence of an action and a scope, unless the scope’s name occurs in the action.
Formally, we manifest the swapping of independent actions in a structural congruence relation.
Definition 12. The reordering ∼= ⊆ X × X is the least equivalence relation satisfying the rules given in Table 10, and
closed under contexts of the form X ; [·] ; X ′.
We define ∼=α to be the union of ∼= and α-equivalence.
Given a particular message exchange A;B : M , it may possibly seem surprising at first that the reordering
relation allows the respective reception action B:?x to occur before its associated emission action A:B!M . Clearly,
the received message cannot be the intended one. Such a behaviour must be dealt with carefully, e.g., by rejecting
unintended messages, but its existence cannot be avoided; it is a matter of fact in concurrent systems that exchange
messages asynchronously.
Labelled transitions. We define a straightforward labelled semantics of executable narrations, in style influenced by
the spi-calculus, in Table 11.
Our semantics relates two executable narrations with a transition
A:β−−→ where A ∈ A and β is either an input action
?M where M ∈ M or a bound output action (νn˜) B!M where n˜ is a (possibly empty) list of pairwise distinct names
n1 · · · nk (that are bound in the remainder), B ∈ A and M ∈ M. If k = 0 (i.e. n˜ is empty), we will simply write B!M .
Note that there is no internal action in our formal semantics of narrations. We might also have introduced a rule
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Table 10
Reordering
∼=-S-S A 6= C
A:B!E ; C :D!F ∼= C :D!F ; A:B!E
∼=-S-C A 6= C
A:B!E ; C :φ ∼= C :φ ; A:B!E
∼=-S-R A 6= C
A:B!E ; C :?x ∼= C :?x ; A:B!E
∼=-R-C A 6= C
A:?x ; C :φ ∼= C :φ ; A:?x
∼=-R-R A 6= C
A:?x ; C :?y ∼= C :?y ; A:?x
∼=-C-C A 6= C
A:φ ; C :ψ ∼= C :ψ ; A:φ
∼=-S-N n 6∈ n(E)
A:B!E ; νn ∼= νn ; A:B!E
∼=-C-N n 6∈ n(φ)
A:φ ; νn ∼= νn ; A:φ
∼=-R-N
A:?x ; νn ∼= νn ; A:?x
∼=-N-N
νn ; νm ∼= νm ; νn
Table 11
Labelled semantics of executable narrations
SEND
JEK = M ∈ M
A:B!E ; X A:B!M−−−−→ X
RECEIVE
A:?x ; X A:?M−−−→ X{M/x }@A
M ∈ M
CHECK
X
A:β−−→ X ′
A:φ ; X A:β−−→ X ′
JφK = true
OPEN
X
A:(νn˜) B!M−−−−−−−→ X ′
νz ; X A:(νzn˜) B!M−−−−−−−−→ X ′
z ∈ n(M) \ {n˜}
REARRANGE
X ∼=α X ′ X ′ A:β−−→ X ′′
X
A:β−−→ X ′′
COM
X
A:(νn˜) B!M−−−−−−→ X ′ X ′ B:?M−−−→ X ′′
X
τ−→ νn˜ ; X ′′
but we tend to insist on the fact that every communication necessarily passes through the network, while such a rule
COM would allow to avoid this.
5. Rewriting protocol narrations . . . into spi-calculus
The spi-calculus is a process calculus that was designed in order to study cryptographic protocols. In this section,
we show that executable narrations closely correspond to terms in a quite restricted fragment of the spi-calculus.
Syntax. We use a finite spi-calculus without choice, generated as P by:
P ::= 0 E(x).P E〈F〉.P P | Q (νn) P φP .
It is a subcalculus of the spi-calculus that we used in [9]. Similar in spirit to the Applied pi-calculus [2], it offers
the advantage of making the language of expressions and formulae orthogonal to the process calculus itself. Note also
that since our rewriting process does not use replication nor choice, we have deliberately chosen not to include these
primitives at all.
We use the same syntactic categories (names, agent names) as for narrations.
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Table 12
Labelled semantics of spi-calculus
INPUT
JEK = A ∈ A M ∈ M
E(x).P
A M−−−→ P{M/x }
OUTPUT
JEK = A ∈ A JFK = M ∈ M
E〈F〉.P A M−−−→ P
OPEN
P
(νn˜) A M−−−−−−→ P ′
(νz) P
(νzn˜) A M−−−−−−→ P ′
z ∈ n(M) \ n˜ RES P
µ−→ P ′
(νn) P
µ−→ (νn) P ′
n 6∈ fn(µ)
GUARD
P
µ−→ P ′
φP
µ−→ P ′
JφK = true PAR P µ−→ P ′
P | Q µ−→ P ′ | Q
bn(µ) ∩ fn(Q) = ∅
STRUCT
P ≡ P ′ P ′ µ−→ P ′′
P
µ−→ P ′′
In process E(x).P , the variable x is bound in P and in the process (νn) P , the name n is bound in P . For a process
P , we denote its set of free names fn(P), bound names bn(P), free variables fv(P) and bound variables bv(P).
Semantics. Table 12 shows a labelled semantics for the spi-calculus. It relies on the definition of structural congruence
≡ defined as the least congruence satisfying:
• ∀P, Q, R : (P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R)
• ∀P, Q : P | Q ≡ Q | P
• ∀P : P | 0 ≡ P
• ∀P, Q, n : (νn) P | Q ≡ (νn) (P | Q) if n 6∈ fn(Q)
• ∀P, Q : P ≡ Q if P and Q are α-equivalent.
According to the rules INPUT and OUTPUT, communication can only occur on agent names. This limitation of the
“standard” semantics of the spi-calculus is just for convenience: our rewriting process will always only put agent
names in place of channels. Also, since it is syntactically impossible to hide an agent name from the outside, we do
not even consider internal communication. Transitions are thus of two kinds: either an input action A M or a bound
output action (νn˜) A M where in both the cases A ∈ A and M ∈ M, n˜ being a (possibly empty) list of pairwise distinct
names that are binding occurrences in M .
Executable narrations in spi-calculus. As the reader might have noticed, the executable narrations as of Section 2 and
the spi-calculus above are similar. Thus, we may now provide a straightforward translation of executable narrations
into the spi-calculus and easily show that the semantics is preserved. The main idea is that the implicit concurrency
structure of narrations as encoded with explicit agent names is projected out (XA of Definition 13) and explicitly
represented using the parallel composition operator of the spi-calculus. Any intended sequential occurrence of actions,
namely those actions that are associated with the same agent, is preserved by using the prefix operator of the spi-
calculus. The private names are then simply put as a top-level restriction around the parallel composition.
Definition 13 (Translation). Let X ∈ X be an executable narration.
(1) A(X) (Table 13) defines the set of agents acting in X .
(2) R(X) (Table 13) defines the set of fresh restricted names of X .
(3) XA (Table 13) defines the spi projection of X on A ∈ A.
(4) The translation T JXK of X into spi-calculus is defined by:
T JXK def= (νn) n∈R(X) ∏
A∈A(X)
XA,
where (νn) n∈I and
∏
n∈I denote n-ary restriction and composition.
(5) T JA:?MK def= A M and T JA:(νn˜) B!MK def= (νn˜) B M map transition labels.
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Table 13
Definition ofA(·), R(·), and ··
A() def= ∅
A(A:B!E ; X) def= {A} ∪A(X)
A(A:?x ; X) def= {A} ∪A(X)
A(A:φ ; X) def= {A} ∪A(X)
A(νn ; X) def= A(X)
R()
def= ∅
R(A:B!E ; X) def= R(X)
R(A:?x ; X) def= R(X)
R(A:φ ; X) def= R(X)
R(νn ; X) def= {n} ∪ R(X)
A
def= 0
(A′:B!E ; X)A def=
{
B〈E〉.XA if A′ = A
XA otherwise
(A′:?x ; X)A def=
{
A(x).XA if A′ = A
XA otherwise
(A′:φ ; X)A def=
{
φXA if A′ = A
XA otherwise
(νn ; X)A def= XA
Table 14
Correspondence of abstract and spyer syntax for expressions and formulae
Expressions
this paper ; spyer
a a
x x
A A
{E}F enc(E,F)
DF (E) dec(E,F)
(E . F) <E,F>
this paper ; spyer
pi1(E) fst(E)
pi2(E) snd(E)
pub(E) pub(E)
priv(E) priv(E)
H(E) hash(E)
Formulae
this paper ; spyer
[E :M ] wff(E)
[E=F ] [E=F]
inv(E, F) inv(E,F)
F ∧G F /\G
The following theorem concludes that the operational semantics of executable narrations and their spi-calculus
translations precisely coincide up to ≡.
Theorem 14. Let X ∈ X be an executable narration.
(1) If X
A:β−−→ X ′ then T JXK T JA:βK−−−−→ P ′ with P ′ ≡ T JX ′K.
(2) If T JXK µ−→ P ′ then there exists A ∈ A, X ′ and β such that X A:β−−→ X ′, P ′ ≡ T JX ′K and µ = T JA:βK.
Proof. By transition induction. Straightforward due to the tailor-made definition of the target calculus in the light of
the translation mapping. 
6. Spyer
spyer is a tool, developed in OCaml, that implements the previous formal developments. A source distribution of
spyer can be found online [11]; an early version was developed by Gensoul [19].
spyer takes as an input file an extended protocol narration (using also the syntactic sugar described at the end
of Section 1) and outputs an executable protocol narration and/or a network of spi-calculus processes. The latter can
then be used as input for our bisimulation checker sbc that implements the symbolic bisimulation described in [9].
We have briefly summarised in Table 14 the correspondence between the abstract syntax of expressions and formulae
used in this paper and the expressions and formulae used by spyer.
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Before commenting some examples adapted from [14], we explain how consistency formulae, which can quickly
become huge, may be simplified.
6.1. Simplifying formula
The various subformulae generated by the consistency formula of Definition 4 contain lots of redundant
information.
Example 15. For example, if K = {(A, A), (B, B), ((A . B), x), (A, pi1(x)), (B, pi2(x))}, then
Φ(K ) = [ A :M ] ∧ [ B :M ] ∧ [ x :M ]
∧ [pi1(x) :M ] ∧ [pi2(x) :M ]
∧ [ A=pi1(x) ] ∧ [ B=pi2(x) ]
∧ [ x=(A . B) ] ∧ [ x=(pi1(x) . B) ]
∧ [ x=(pi1(x) . pi2(x)) ] ∧ [ x=(A . pi2(x)) ]
∧ inv(A, A)∧ inv(A, pi1(x))
∧ inv(B, B)∧ inv(B, pi2(x))
∧ inv(x, x)∧ inv(x, (A . B))∧ inv(x, (A . pi2(x)))
∧ inv(x, (pi1(x) . pi2(x)))∧ inv(x, (pi1(x) . B)).
Actually, we should also add the symmetric tests since they are syntactically different and the Definition 4 ignores the
symmetry of [ ·=·] and inv(·, ·).
To avoid this combinatorial explosion, we devise some mostly straightforward rules to simplify formulae. Before
stating them, we define formula equivalence.
Definition 16 (Formula Equivalence). Two formulae φ and ψ are equivalent – written φ ≈ ψ – if and only if for all
(closing) substitutions σ : V→ M, we have Jφσ K = Jψσ K.
Since substitution corresponds to message reception, two formulae are thus equivalent if they evaluate in the same
way in every execution.
In the following enumeration of equivalence laws, with φ1 ∧ φ2 ≈ φ2 ∧ φ1 and (φ1 ∧ φ2) ∧ φ3 ≈ φ1 ∧ (φ2 ∧ φ3),
we consider formulae up to commutativity and associativity of the conjunction operator.
The first set of laws states the symmetry and transitivity of the equality test.
• [E=F ] ∧φ ≈ [F=E ] ∧φ
• [E=F ] ∧ [F=G ] ∧φ ≈ [E=F ] ∧ [E=G ] ∧φ.
The second set of laws simplifies well-formedness tests or inversion tests.
• If φ = [E :M ] ∧φ′ and E is an expression without deconstructors (i.e., that does not contain any occurrence of
pi1(·), pi2(·) or D·(·)), then φ ≈ φ′.
• If φ = [E :M ] ∧φ′ and E appear as a subexpression of an expression appearing in φ′, then φ ≈ φ′.
• If φ = [pi1(E) :M ] ∧φ′ and pi1(E) or pi2(E) appear as a subexpression of an expression appearing in φ′, then
φ ≈ φ′.
• If φ = [pi2(E) :M ] ∧φ′ and pi1(E) or pi2(E) appear as a subexpression of an expression appearing in φ′, then
φ ≈ φ′.
• inv(M,M−1)∧φ ≈ φ.
The third set of laws rewrites well-formedness tests or inversion tests in terms of equality tests.
• inv(E, F)∧φ ≈ [DF ({G}E ) :M ] ∧φ for all G that do not contain deconstructors or if it contains some, they are
inside an exact occurrence of E or F . For example, G = F or G = E are valid choices for G.
• [E :M ] ∧φ ≈ [E=E ] ∧φ.
The following law states a substitutivity property of equality:
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• [E=F ] ∧φ ≈ [E=F ] ∧φ′, for all φ′ which is φ where some occurrences of E has been replaced by F or
conversely.
Finally, the last set of laws rewrites equality tests such that the resulting expressions contain fewer constructors.
• [(E1 . E2)=(F1 . F2) ] ∧φ ≈ [E1=F1 ] ∧ [E2=F2 ] ∧φ
• [{E1}E2={F1}F2 ] ∧φ ≈ [E1=F1 ] ∧ [E2=F2 ] ∧φ
• [H(E)=H(F) ] ∧φ ≈ [E=F ] ∧φ
• [pub(E)=pub(F) ] ∧φ ≈ [E=F ] ∧φ
• [priv(E)=priv(F) ] ∧φ ≈ [E=F ] ∧φ
• [(E1 . E2)=F ] ∧φ ≈ [E1=pi1(F) ] ∧ [E2=pi2(F) ] ∧φ.
Example 17. With the above laws, the formula of Example 15 is provably equivalent to:
ψ = [ A=pi1(x) ] ∧ [ B=pi2(x) ].
These ideas are implemented in spyer. Moreover, it exploits the fact that the consistency formula is only used
when adding a pair (M, x) to an already reduced knowledge set K . So, to avoid that the same checks are performed
several times, it keeps in a formula only the atoms involving the variable x .
6.2. The Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol
First, we give the input file corresponding to the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol that we have studied earlier in this
article.
(* Wide Mouthed Frog protocol *)
(* initial knowledge *)
A,B,S know A B S
A,S share kAS
B,S share kBS
A generates kAB
A know m
(* protocol narration *)
A -> S: <A,enc(<B,kAB>,kAS)>
S -> B: enc(<A,B,kAB>,kBS)
A -> B: enc(m,kAB)
We then invoke spyer with the above file to obtain the following executable narration:
new kAS
new kBS
A: new kAB
A: S!<A,enc(<B,kAB>,kAS)>
S: ?0
S: inv(snd(dec(snd(0),kAS)),snd(dec(snd(0),kAS)))
[B = fst(dec(snd(0),kAS))]
[A = fst(0)]
S: B!enc(<A,<B,snd(dec(snd(0),kAS))>>,kBS)
B: ?1
B: inv(snd(snd(dec(1,kBS))),
snd(snd(dec(1,kBS))))
[B = fst(snd(dec(1,kBS)))]
[A = fst(dec(1,kBS))]
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A: B!enc(m,kAB)
B: ?2
B: inv(dec(2,snd(snd(dec(1,kBS)))),
dec(2,snd(snd(dec(1,kBS)))))
Finally, this gives the following spi-calculus system:
agent A(agent_A, agent_B, agent_S, kAS, m) =
(^kAB)
’agent_S<<agent_A, enc(<agent_B, kAB>, kAS)>>.
’agent_B<enc(m, kAB)>.0)
agent B(agent_A, agent_B, kBS) =
agent_B(x_1).
{[agent_B = fst(snd(dec(x_1, kBS)))]
/\ [agent_A = fst(dec(x_1, kBS))]
/\ wff(dec(enc(kBS, snd(snd(dec(x_1, kBS)))),
snd(snd(dec(x_1, kBS)))))}
agent_B(x_2).
{wff(dec(enc(kBS,
dec(x_2, snd(snd(dec(x_1, kBS))))),
dec(x_2, snd(snd(dec(x_1, kBS))))))}0
agent S(agent_A, agent_B, agent_S, kAS, kBS) =
agent_S(x_0).
{[agent_B = fst(dec(snd(x_0), kAS))]
/\ [agent_A = fst(x_0)]
/\ wff(dec(enc(kAS, snd(dec(snd(x_0), kAS))),
snd(dec(snd(x_0), kAS))))}
’agent_B<enc(<agent_A, <agent_B,
snd(dec(snd(x_0), kAS))>>,
kBS)>.0
agent System(agent_A, agent_B, agent_S, m) =
(^kAS, kBS)
(A(agent_A, agent_B, agent_S, kAS, m)
| B(agent_A, agent_B, kBS)
| S(agent_A, agent_B, agent_S, kAS, kBS))
6.3. The Otway–Rees protocol
In the Otway–Rees protocol, lots of redundant information is shared by participants. For example, the message m
appears in every single message exchange. The extended narration corresponding to the Otway–Rees protocol is:
(* Otway Rees protocol *)
(* initial knowledge *)
A,B,S know A B S
A,S share kAS
B,S share kBS
A know m
A generates nA
B generates nB
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S generates kAB
(* protocol narration *)
A -> B : <m,A,B,enc(<nA,m,A,B>,kAS)>
B -> S : <m,A,B,enc(<nA,m,A,B>,kAS),enc(<nB,m,A,B>,kBS)>
S -> B : <m,enc(<nA,kAB>,kAS),enc(<nB,kAB>,kBS)>
B -> A : <m,enc(<nA,kAB>,kAS)>
The executable narration computed by spyer is then:
new kAS
new kBS
A: new nA
B: new nB
S: new kAB
A: B!<m,<A,<B,enc(<nA,<m,<A,B>>>,kAS)>>>
B: ?0
B: inv(snd(snd(snd(0))),snd(snd(snd(0))))
inv(fst(0),fst(0))
[B = fst(snd(snd(0)))]
[A = fst(snd(0))]
B: S!<fst(0),<A,<B,<snd(snd(snd(0))),
enc(<nB,<fst(0),<A,B>>>,kBS)>>>>
S: ?1
S: inv(fst(dec(snd(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kBS)),
fst(dec(snd(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kBS)))
inv(fst(dec(fst(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kAS)),
fst(dec(fst(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kAS)))
inv(fst(1),fst(1))
[fst(1) = fst(snd(dec(snd(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kBS)))]
[fst(1) = fst(snd(dec(fst(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kAS)))]
[<A,B> = snd(snd(dec(snd(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kBS)))]
[<A,B> = snd(snd(dec(fst(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kAS))))]
[B = fst(snd(snd(1)))]
[A = fst(snd(1))]
S: B!<fst(1),
<enc(<fst(dec(fst(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kAS)),kAB>,kAS),
enc(<fst(dec(snd(snd(snd(snd(1)))),kBS)),kAB>,kBS)>>
B: ?2
B: inv(snd(dec(snd(snd(2)),kBS)),snd(dec(snd(snd(2)),kBS)))
inv(fst(snd(2)),fst(snd(2)))
[fst(2) = fst(0)]
[nB = fst(dec(snd(snd(2)),kBS))]
B: A!<fst(2),fst(snd(2))>
A: ?3
A: inv(snd(dec(snd(3),kAS)),snd(dec(snd(3),kAS)))
[nA = fst(dec(snd(3),kAS))]
[m = fst(3)]
Actually, if the computation of the consistency formulae was following literally what we devised in Section 2, the
generated formulae of S would contain more than 300,000 (!) equality tests.
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7. Related work
We roughly and somewhat artificially divide the list of competing approaches into two classes. One class tries to
tightly associate some formal semantics with (variants of) narrations themselves. Another class provides less tight
associations, usually involving a different target formalism: here, we may distinguish approaches that informally
reformulate narrations within a different formalism from those that offer mostly automated translations from narrations
into target formalisms, but do not clearly justify the underlying translation principles (if exposed at all). Let us, for the
purpose of structuring this section, use the terms “tight” and “lax” semantics to separate the two classes.
Sumii et al. [28] propose a formal semantics of narrations by translation into spi-calculus. The paper is written in
Japanese, so it remains unclear to us how “tight” the approach really is, how they treat the problem of checks-on-
reception, and also whether there is any formal or informal justification of the translation principles. In any case, our
own intention was to provide a formal semantics that does not require the use of an underlying (and possibly too)
general process calculus, so our approach is still substantially different.
Tight semantics
The work of Caleiro, Vigano´ and Basin [12,13] is quite similar in spirit and aim with our work. They defined a trace-
based denotational semantics and gave a corresponding operational semantics with a variant of pattern-matching spi-
calculus as target language. Some underlying ideas are quite similar to ours but we find our formalism of knowledge
sets is more light-weight (although equally powerful) than their theory of view/opacity. The view that a principal has
of a message M corresponds to how far it understands the message M with its current knowledge. A message is
said to be opaque for a participant if the latter is not able to analyse at all the form of the message (this corresponds
to a view equal to a special symbol γM ). To relate to these definitions, one might say that our approach consists in
considering that initially a received message M is opaque and is thus bound to a fresh variable xM . Then, the analysis
of the receiver’s knowledge set resulting from the addition of (M, xM ) to its current knowledge set corresponds to
computing the view that the receiver then has of this particular message. In addition, the receiver also updates the
“view” that it has of other previously received message. Then, we can directly use the result of the analysis to say
which checks have to occur after the reception of M . In contrast, Caleiro, Vigano´ and Basin had to introduce and refer
to further concepts like the facial pattern, the constructive form and the inner facial pattern (and relate them with the
concept of view) before being able to give an operational semantics. The main simplification in our setting arises from
the joint treatment of messages and associated “views” as knowledge elements of the form (M, E).
Another way to give semantics to protocol narrations could exploit the widely-developed machinery of strand
spaces [30], proposed by Thayer Fa´brega, Herzog and Guttman. This formalism has proved to be a successful
framework for reasoning on and verifying security properties of cryptographic protocols [21]. Strand spaces are
graphs that represent the intended protocol behaviour of narrations by an explicit use of arrow notations: one type of
arrow captures the sequential dependencies within individual participants, giving rise to strands; another type of arrow
captures the flow of messages between strands. In contrast to mere narrations, strand spaces are not limited to represent
just the intended behaviour, but also the behaviour of malicious attackers, represented as the so-called penetrator
strands. Since strand spaces come with a formal semantics, in terms of the so-called bundles, these immediately also
provide some semantics for narrations. A bundle can be understood as a causality-closed subgraph of a given strand
space. As such, it represents the possible result of a valid executions of the strand space. However, there is no notion
of dynamic execution that could be understood as a form of operational semantics. Thus, there is also no study of
dynamic checks-on-reception, which is the main technical contribution of the current paper.
On the other hand, strand spaces have also been studied by Crazzolara and Winskel in comparison to other models
of concurrency [15,16], notably including event structures Petri nets and the algebraic process language SPL; the latter
is a simplified (since channel-free) spi-calculus that is enhanced with some form of pattern-matching (cf. also [22] for
pattern-matching in a more standard spi-calculus, and our comments below). Since these models of concurrency – in
particular the language SPL – are equipped with forms of operational semantics, one might think that their relation to
strand spaces could provide an operational semantics of the latter “for free”. This, however, is not the case. In [15],
for any given SPL-process P in some particularly restricted form called !-par process, Crazzolara and Winskel show
how to formally and closely relate the net behaviour Net(P) to the strand space behaviour Tr(P). In contrast, they
do not offer any way to translate strand spaces back into SPL-terms, which would be required to inherit the desired
operational semantics. In [16], the authors further refine the relation between SPL and strand spaces by extending the
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latter with a notion of conflict to allow for better composition properties. Still, they offer no way to translate arbitrary
strand spaces to SPL processes.
Lax semantics
The work of Bodei et al. [7,8] is also similar to ours, although still quite different. Like us, they present a refinement
of protocol narrations, but the respective checks-on-reception appear only informally. Like us, they split message
exchanges into three parts, albeit different to ours. A formal semantics is then only provided after “rewriting”, again
informally, refined narrations into terms of their channel-free process calculus LYSA. To our knowledge, the above
papers (short and long version) provide the best available information about the system underlying their “systematic
expansion”. Still, the expansion is not unambiguously explained, while our expansion is fully automatic, based on
simple intuitive principles and generates a maximum number of checks according to these principles. Finally, their
approach aims at static analysis techniques, while we ultimately target at dynamic analysis, e.g., as in the form of
bisimulation checks [9] in the full spi-calculus.
In other related approaches, narrations are reformulated or translated using Casper [24], HLPSL2IF [5], CAPSL
[26], CASRUL [23], or (s)pi-calculus [3,6]. They have in common that they do not easily help to understand how the
gap between the rather informal narrations and the target formalism is bridged. A compiler can itself be interpreted
as giving semantics to narrations, but usually the translation process is not well-explained or otherwise justified, in
particular regarding the treatment of checks-on-reception. Moreover, our interest was to try to formalise the semantics
at the level of narrations rather than by translation into some reasonably unrelated target formalism.
A subtle, but interesting difference between our work and Casper [24] is their modified message syntax using a
construction M % v, meaning that the recipient of M should not try to decrypt M. We think this construct was added
because of Casper’s rather strict policy to require, unless the % is used, to be able to fully decrypt all messages (and
possibly provide a warning in case this fails). Our (arguably more flexible) policy is instead to require agents to always
just try to decrypt messages as far as their current knowledge permits, so we implicitly let agents accept messages
even if they cannot (yet) fully decrypt them.
As we previously observed (cf. Section 3.3), the pattern-matching spi-calculus of [22] is not expressive enough
to capture the checks-on-reception we require. To overcome its limitations (in the part of our work that deals with
rewriting into spi-calculus), we could have used a variant similar in spirit to the one of [13]. However, we found it
more orthogonal and extensible to express those checks by means of dedicated formulae. Moreover, our use of this
version of the spi-calculus was driven by the wish to have our tool spyer generate spi-calculus code that is compatible
with our symbolic bisimulation checker based on [9]. Finally, note that the aim of [22] was to offer a type system to
study safety property of processes, but not to enable an automated way to turn protocol narrations into spi-calculus
processes.
8. Conclusions
Contributions. In summary, we stepwise enhance protocol narrations in order to build up enough structure such
that a well-motivated formalisation of their operational semantics becomes possible. The main technical contribution
is the proposal of the automatic generation of “checks-on-reception”, together with a suitable representation of the
principals’ knowledge on which the generation depends.
If one wants to reformulate informal protocol narrations within a calculus like the spi-calculus, then we propose
the following method:
(1) Extend the narration, as shown in Section 1, by a declaration part making precise the origin of and initial
knowledge about the involved data (names). This step requires human interaction, because ambiguities need to be
resolved.
(2) Compile the resulting narration, as shown in Section 2, into an executable narration. This step can now be done
automatically.
(3) Extract the implicit concurrency, as shown just above. Again, automatically.
It is worthwhile pointing out that our approach does not bother the protocol designer to come up with suitable or
sufficient checks-on-reception, because they are generated automatically. Our approach does not even require the
designer to actually look at these generated checks at all.
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Future work. Here, we do not tackle the fourth task listed by Abadi [1] on how to get to a formalisation of concurrent
sessions on the basis of protocol narrations. The main problem is that principalsmay play different roles in concurrent
sessions such that the lookup of their respective keys needs to be dealt with dynamically. The usual convenient
confusion of the two concepts of principal and role is no longer appropriate, so we propose to nontrivially extend the
narration notation rather than providing a suboptimal semantics to an inappropriate notation. Note that this confusion
also rules out the na}¨ive modelling of concurrent sessions by the bare unbounded replication within spi-calculus. Some
inspiration from the work of Cremers and Mauw [17] and the work done in the context of mixed strand spaces [29,
20] may help us here.
Furthermore, it should be possible to develop reasoning techniques for protocol narrations via an environment-
sensitive extension of our semantics that could be used to define and study meaningful behavioural equivalences.
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Appendix. A note about synthesis, flat analysis, closure set and stratified analysis
In this appendix, we compare our “stratified” approach to compute analyses to the usual “flat” approach. We do so
by means of projection, focusing on the message components of our knowledge sets. This comparison is mainly
intended to help readers who are familiar with Paulson’s inductive approach (see [27]) to better understand our
formalism. In particular, we show that the stratified analysis of a message set yields a complete knowledge seed.
Definition 18. If S ⊆ M, we define
(1) The synthesis synth(S) of S is the smallest set satisfying
SYN-INC
M ∈ S
M ∈ synth(S) SYN-PAIR
M ∈ synth(S) N ∈ synth(S)
(M . N ) ∈ synth(S)
SYN-ENC
M ∈ synth(S) N ∈ synth(S)
{M}N ∈ synth(S)
SYN-PUB
M ∈ synth(S)
pub(M) ∈ synth(S) SYN-PRIV
M ∈ synth(S)
priv(M) ∈ synth(S)
SYN-HASH
M ∈ synth(S)
H(M) ∈ synth(S)
(2) the flat analysis analyz(S) of S is the smallest set satisfying
ANA-INC
M ∈ S
M ∈ analyz(S) ANA-FST
(M . N ) ∈ analyz(S)
M ∈ analyz(S)
ANA-SND
(M . N ) ∈ analyz(S)
N ∈ analyz(S)
ANA-DEC
{M}N ∈ analyz(S) N−1 ∈ synth(S)
M ∈ analyz(S)
(3) the closure set close(S) of S is the smallest superset of S closed under both the flat analysis and the synthesis.
(4) the stratified analysis A(S) of S is
+∞⋃
i=0
Ai (S) where
• A0(S) = S
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• Ai+1(S) = analyz(Ai (S)).
Definition 19. Let S ⊆ M.
• S is closed under synthesis if and only if synth(S) ⊆ S
• S is closed under flat analysis if and only if analyz(S) ⊆ S.
It is well-known that synth(analyz(S)) ( close(S).
For example, if S = {(k . {m}priv((k . k)))} then m 6∈ synth(analyz(S)) whereas m ∈ close(S).
The remainder of this section is devoted to show that synth(A(S)) = close(S).
synth(A(S)) ⊆ close(S). To show this inclusion, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 20. Let S, T ⊆ M and assume that S ⊆ T . Then
• synth(S) ⊆ synth(T )
• analyz(S) ⊆ analyz(T ).
Proof. See [10]. 
Proof (of the First Inclusion). We first show that for all i ∈ N, Ai (S) ⊆ close(S).
Indeed, for i = 0, we have A0(S) = S which is a subset of close(S) by definition.
Then, if we assume by induction that Ai (S) ⊆ close(S), then by Lemma 20, we have analyz(Ai (S)) ⊆
analyz(close(S)), i.e. Ai+1(S) ⊆ analyz(close(S)). But since analyz(close(S)) ⊆ close(S), we have thus Ai+1(S) ⊆
close(S).
Hence, we have A(S) ⊆ close(S).
Thus, still by Lemma 20, we have synth(A(S)) ⊆ synth(close(S)) and since synth(close(S)) ⊆ close(S), we
conclude that synth(A(S)) ⊆ close(S). 
close(S) ⊆ synth(A(S)). To show this inclusion, we need the following lemmae:
Lemma 21. Let S ⊆ M. Then synth(synth(S)) = synth(S).
Proof. See [10]. 
Lemma 22. Let S ⊆ M. Then A(S) is closed under flat analysis, i.e.
analyz(A(S)) ⊆ A(S).
Proof. See [10]. 
Lemma 23. Let S ⊆ M. Then if S is closed under flat analysis then so is synth(S), i.e.
analyz(S) ⊆ S =⇒ analyz(synth(S)) ⊆ synth(S).
Proof. See [10]. 
Proof (of the Second Inclusion). We can now show that synth(A(S)) is a superset of S closed both under flat analysis
and synthesis.
First, we have S = A0(S) ⊆ A(S), so S ⊆ synth(A(S)) and thus synth(A(S)) is a superset of S.
By Lemma 22, we have analyz(A(S)) ⊆ A(S). So by Lemma 23, we have analyz(synth(A(S))) ⊆ synth(A(S)).
Hence synth(A(S)) is closed under flat analysis.
By Lemma 21, we have synth(synth(A(S))) = synth(A(S)) so, in particular, synth(synth(A(S))) ⊆ synth(A(S)).
Hence synth(A(S)) is closed under synthesis.
Since close(S) is the smallest superset of S which is closed both under synthesis and flat analysis, we have
close(S) ⊆ synth(A(S)). 
Conclusion. We have finally shown that synth(A(S)) = close(S).
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